Confucianism and Modern China

The paper sums up the conclusions of two important philosophical events in respect to Confucianism, namely the 23^rd Congress of Philosophy, Athens, August 2013 and the International Symposium on Confucianism in the World, Lomonosov Moscow State University, November 2013. In both conferences Confucianism has been examined from the point of view of its aptitude to contribute to the ideological, moral and cultural identity of modern China.

At the 23^rd World Congress of Philosophy China was well represented by a delegation of 200 professors and scholars from the top Universities and Institutions of the country. More than sixty papers concerned Confucianism and other Chinese philosophical theories.

Last November I was invited by the Lomonosov Moscow State University to speak at the International Symposium on Confucianism in Russia and the world. Thirty participants from Beijing, Sichuan, Shandong, Moscow, St. Petersburg and Tel Aviv Universities debated on current issues of Confucianism.

Based on these academic meetings, I shall give a brief account of the main lines of thought concerning the role of Confucianism in modern China.

First, it is important to keep in mind that Confucianism has been an active part of Chinese culture for more than two thousand five hundred years. Being the official ideology of the Empire for two millennia, it has contributed to shaping the mental, political, administrative and moral landscape of historical China. Solicited to enlighten and guide the successive configurations of Chinese history, Confucianism has constantly been revisited, reexamined, recasted and contextualized. Besides, the constant resourcing in tradition may explain in a certain measure the “Chinese miracle” as such. A strictly speaking economic boom is managed by virtue of a flexible but solid background of cultural responses.

It is worth mentioning that Marxism and its ideological heritage have not developed a moral theory. In the present Chinese context, Confucianism is invited to provide moral guidelines to all levels, political, social and personal alike.

The interaction of Confucianism with modern politics is ambiguous. Until recently, it was denounced as superstitious and backwards, the morality of feudal society. However, modern China needs to formulate a purely Chinese worldview and Confucianism recasted and duly contextualized is a strong asset.

First, it advocates that a State may enjoy harmony, stability, peace and prosperity if and only if the leaders conduct themselves with humanity and rightness (ren yi, 任义). Confucius compares the ruler to the polar star. Standing still, the star lights the night sky and guides travelers in their nocturnal journey. In the same way, the ruler has to inspire people by his/her own living example of right conduct. Therefore, morality is the pillar of a long and prosperous State.

The three public priorities of the Chinese State are food, education and healthcare. Without underestimating their obvious actuality, it is worth mentioning that Confucianism has steadily and permanently promoted the same political agenda.

Moreover, there is much discussion today about harmony and stability (hexie wending, 和谐稳定), which Confucians have first advanced as political and social ideals. The direction to follow may also be traced back to tradition. Union and equilibrium between social or ethnic groups does not mean unity or assimilation. Differences are to be respected and find their expression within collective, national goals.

An aftermath of political ethics is managerial ethics and the application of Confucian values and aspirations to business management. Confucian management is a very active and upcoming field of business ethics.

The second aspect of recasted Confucianism concerns society at large and individual conduct. In the past few years Confucian classics have been translated in simplified versions, sometimes illustrated in the manner of comics, and sold by millions. Even famous TV show persons have taken an interest. It is a phenomenon of fashion, but, by its very popularity, it works. Simple and practical values, ideals and interpersonal relations exercise a real and massive influence on a great part of the population.

Filial piety, devotion and respect, honesty and loyalty are the pillars of Confucian ethics. The importance of family relations is explained as part of the solidity of Chinese society and its resistance to the impact of Western individualistic morality. Furthermore, family relations constitute the archetypal example of all social and political relations. Chinese society presents a compact and solid infrastructure of tight personal relations creating personal networks which work on a complex base of reciprocal obligations and favors.

Finally, the Russian-Chinese Symposium has laid stress on the importance of ritual and propriety (li,礼). Rites do not exclusively concern formal occasions or religious festivities. According to Confucius, they impregnate human life in its totality by bestowing solemnity even to the most trivial act. They facilitate cooperation and thwart frictions avoiding violence and all factors of social volatility. They promote harmony and stability. We need more ritual, in the sense of socially approved manners which consolidate the sense of belonging to a community. Neo-Confucianism is also revisited in the light of modern debate on the questions of human rights, fair treatment, equality of chances, etc. Philosophers such as Zhu Xi (朱熹) or Wang Yangming (王扬明) provide a significant conceptual framework along with sound arguments for developing an alternative discourse with Chinese characteristics. 

Last but not least, sound institutions cannot work without upright people. Confucian ethics stress the need to train the ruling class in order to serve the people with loyalty, humaneness and rightness. Moral education and self cultivation acquire an increased significance as the vehicle of forming a well attuned ruling class, ready and willing to respond positively to society’s needs. Neo-Confucians have described with some length the successive steps of the appropriate training. Their views attract much attention.

A last point concerns vocabulary. “Confucianism” is a Western European word conned on terms describing ideological or religious movements. In Chinese it has always been “ru” (儒).  As Confucius said, order comes from the rectification of names. Let’s start by rectifying “Confucianism.”

  

PRELIMINARY NOTES TO COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 

Comparing heterogeneous material, be it religious beliefs, cultural traditions, artistic creations, or philosophical theories comes spontaneously to the human mind. It is no wonder, inasmuch as the procedure permits to bridge the cognitive gap between the familiar and the unfamiliar, the known and the unknown. It also permits to land on safe ground, to domesticate in some sort the imprevisibility of the new, by inscribing it into an already familiar pattern. The other becomes different but not inexplicably/unreasonably alien. It shares some aspects or at least some reference points with the already known. It is not totally different, it is just divergent. Furthermore, I can pin point precise points of divergence, of aliency either directly or by stressing the commonalities with my own stock of references. Such procedures may seem natural and spontaneous; however they result from a complex cluster of mental preconceptions/operations. Such operations are not spontaneous/mechanical; but come about after a series of conscious choices and rearrangements operated by the comparativist.

Comparative Philosophy is not restricted by its content. It may take as subject-matter practically any theory or conceptual scheme the comparativist thinks worth studying. The difference with other branches of philosophy lies primarily in the method and the rigorous axioms or principles it enunciates and is constrained to follow thereafter. In fact, comparing has different levels of validity, credibility and ultimately interest. If it does not comport the restraints of self criticism, then it cannot properly be listed as philosophical endeavor. It may seem self evident, but I think that this is one of the most controversial points of the whole discipline. This is due to another comparative specificity which is often cited but rarely overtly faced. I speak of the mobilization of the cultural, personal, social, even political assumptions which surface time and again in the comparative process. By surfacing, I would like to underline that they are always there, more or less overtly conscious, at times serving as motivation, guidelines, even sanctioning or condemning the “other.”

Apart from the comparativist’s subjectivity –often disguised as “objective” criteria-, comparative philosophy has to elucidate its purpose. If the content covers practically all speculative fields, and the motivation needs to be clearly perceptible both to the comparativist and the reader, the purpose is also inscribed in the method. Is it to make the unfamiliar familiar by the mobilization of familiar intellectual tools? Is it an open questioning of both me and the other taking as a pretext the other’s otherness in order to explore conjointly our unknowability?  In sum, comparative philosophy is a formal discipline. It consists in a clearly enunciated method, which guides the project from the beginning to its ultimate conclusions.